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Social Innovation for Urban Transformation
MATTHEW THOMPSON
Abstract
Innovation is perhaps the buzzword in local economic development policy. 
Associated narrowly with neoliberal ideas, conventional notions of innovation––like its 
capitalocentric counterparts, enterprise and entrepreneurialism––may promise higher 
productivity, global competitiveness and technological progress but do not fundamentally 
change the ‘rules of the game’. In contrast, an emerging field reimagines social innovation 
as disruptive change in social relations and institutional configurations. This article 
explores the conceptual and political differences within this pre-paradigmatic field, and 
argues for a more transformative understanding of social innovation. Building on the 
work of David Graeber, I mobilize the novel constructs of ‘play’ and ‘games’ to advance 
our understanding of the contradictory process of institutionalizing social innovation for 
urban transformation. This is illustrated through a case study of Liverpool, where diverse 
approaches to innovation are employed in attempts to resolve longstanding socio-economic 
problems. Dominant market- and state-led economic development policies––likened to 
a ‘regeneration game’––are contrasted with more experimental, creative, democratic 
and potentially more effective forms of social innovation, seeking urban change through 
playing with the rules of the game. I conclude by considering how the play–game dialectic 
illuminates and reframes the way transformative social innovation might be cultivated by 
urban policy, the contradictions this entails, and possible ways forward.
Introduction
Enterprise, innovation and entrepreneurialism are hot topics in local economic 
development. We can trace this from the original ‘entrepreneurial urbanism’ of the 
1980s through to contemporary ‘late-entrepreneurial’ urbanism (Peck, 2017). Their 
enduring power over urban policy thinking is evident in our age of ‘austerity localism’ 
with, for instance, local enterprise partnerships (LEPs) and enterprise zones rolled out 
in the UK (Williams et al., 2014). These ideas––albeit interpreted differently––are also 
prevalent in counterhegemonic attempts to transform urban spaces and local economies, 
such as the ‘community economies’ approach and the ‘social and solidarity economy’ 
movement (Gibson-Graham, 2006; 2008; Miller, 2013; Scott Cato and North, 2017). At 
their core, enterprise, innovation and entrepreneurialism are about coming up with new 
ideas, or applying old ideas to new contexts, in ways which lead to useful outcomes, and 
have thus been reinterpreted through a ‘social’ lens more attuned to economic 
redistribution, political empowerment and social inclusion than greater efficiency, 
higher output and technological progress in the pursuit of profit. While social 
entrepreneurship relates to the micro, individual scale of the social entrepreneur, and 
social enterprise to the scale of the organization, social innovation has as its wider focus 
the scale of institutions and systems, processes of systemic and institutional change 
(Chalmers, 2012). This makes it an important avenue of enquiry for critical urban studies 
concerned with transformational approaches to local economic development and urban 
regeneration. Just as social entrepreneurship/enterprise have been conceptualized as 
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embryonic ‘pre-paradigmatic fields’ (Nicholls, 2010), so too can social innovation be 
understood as under theorized and highly contested. In this article, I explore how the 
concept of innovation has been mobilized in different urban policy approaches, and 
how  a more ‘maximalist’ social understanding can contribute to progressive urban 
transformation.
Grand claims are made about the disruptive potential of social innovation––
framed as a ‘sixth wave’ of transformational macro-level change, following the five 
familiar technological Kondratiev waves, from the industrial revolution to our nascent 
age of information and telecommunications (Nicholls and Murdock, 2012). Despite 
technological acceleration driving modernity, without concomitant transformations 
in societal structures, we seem to be reaching a saturation point of ‘frenetic standstill’ 
(Rosa, 2013); a ‘post-political’ condition of inertia (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014). Yet 
there are signs we are at the cusp of another seismic socio-economic shift, reflected in 
the proliferation of prefixes to describe what many see as a ‘new economy’––‘social’, 
‘solidarity’, ‘collaborative’, ‘sharing’ economies, to name but a few (Avelino et al., 2015). 
Others point to Post-Post-Fordism (Murray et al., 2015) and even postcapitalism (Mason, 
2015; Srnicek and Williams, 2015). There is a growing sense among such commentators 
that what is needed to unleash the power of fast-evolving peer-to-peer digital 
technologies––and their transformative potential to circumvent mediating hierarchies 
of state-capitalist institutions and connect people in new democratic postcapitalist 
forms––are social innovations that reorganize social relations and the institutional 
configurations through which technologies flow and are in turn shaped. The spectres 
of a post-work economy and technological unemployment make social innovation an 
increasingly pressing concern for all with a stake in the future of cities.
This article explores the possibilities and problematics of building such 
a new economy at the local level, through social innovation aiming at institutional 
transformation in a particular urban context, the Liverpool City Region (LCR). Liverpool 
is an illuminating case as a laboratory of innovation, across economic, technological, 
civic and social domains. This is a city region at the coalface of macro socio-economic 
trajectories, through industrialization, deindustrialization, postindustrialization and, 
potentially, reindustrialization––developing fast in the nineteenth century to become a 
central trading node in a newly globalized colonial capitalism before ‘falling from grace’ 
in the twentieth century, with severe structural decline precipitating the loss of around 
half its population and much of its maritime-dependent employment (Sykes et al., 2013; 
Southern, 2014; North, 2017). Through this period, LCR was at the forefront of various 
innovations: it pioneered the modern world’s first enclosed stone dock, in 1715; the 
world’s first inter-city passenger railway in 1830; and led the way in integrated sewerage 
systems, underground, overhead and overwater metro railways, cast iron churches, 
electric trams, and underwater road tunnels (Sykes et al., 2013). The city region built 
the world’s first municipal public park in Birkenhead in the 1840s; the country’s first 
municipal housing in 1869 (including pioneering the use of prefabricated concrete); one 
of the first industrial-utopian model villages at Port Sunlight; and the world’s first school 
dedicated to urban planning, the University of Liverpool’s Department of Civic Design 
(Dockerill, 2016). Alongside these technical and civic innovations, LCR has long been a 
hotbed of political radicalism and cultural creativity. Often described as an ‘edgy city’, 
its cosmopolitan intercontinental culture has produced remarkable cultural creativity, 
not least Mersey Beat, the Liverpool Poets and the Beatles; while revolt and resistance 
has led to a flourishing of social innovation (Taylor, 2011).
Socially innovative projects emerged in Liverpool from the 1960s in response 
to state and market failure, inspired by local political traditions, notably the influence 
of anarcho-syndicalism from visiting Spanish seafarers (Southern, 2014). The 
city has long spawned innovations in the social economy, including the charities 
Citizen’s Advice Bureau, Legal Aid and Age Concern and, more recently, among 
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the country’s first city–regional networks of social enterprises and Social Stock 
Exchange (Heap et al., 2017). In the 1970s, co-operative housing and community 
development trust movements were developed by working class communities in 
reaction to the destruction of docks-based employment from economic restructuring, 
the laying waste to many inner-city dockside neighbourhoods, and the lack of state 
intervention to provide sufficient public services to cope with consequent social issues 
(Taylor, 2011). Sykes et al. (2013) argue that this economic disaster was compounded by 
public policy mistakes: Liverpool City Council’s so-called slum clearance programme 
removed hundreds of thousands of dockside residents to isolated housing estates on 
the metropolitan periphery, where the promise of new industries failed to materialize. 
Co-ops were established by residents, in co-operation with professionals, initially out 
of resistance to state-led displacement and the bureaucratic paternalism of public 
landlordism (Thompson, 2015). Weller Street Co-op members chose the architects 
with whom they worked closely to co-design, develop and then own and manage 
their new-build housing co-op––a first in British history. Out of this movement 
came the Eldonians who, in the context of mass unemployment in the early 1980s, 
reimagined their ex-industrial and contaminated neighbourhood as a ‘self-regenerating 
community’––a vision realized with the establishment of the Eldonian Community 
and Development Trusts, which today employ over a hundred local people, support 
countless local businesses and social enterprises and manage a number of community 
amenities––leisure centre, day nursery, residential elderly care home, village hall and 
pub––as well as affordable housing. The Eldonians are cited as a pioneering exemplar 
of social innovation (Roberts, 2008).
Liverpool has also been at the forefront of policy innovation in tackling urban 
decline. As early as the 1980s, it was clear that the long line of regeneration experiments 
had largely failed to counteract socio-economic decline:
Since the 1960s, the city has been the recipient, or victim, of every urban 
experiment invented, including Tony Crosland’s educational priority areas, Jim 
Callaghan’s traditional urban programme, Roy Jenkin’s community development 
projects, the Home Office’s Brunswick neighbourhood project, Peter Walker’s 
inner area studies, Peter Shore’s inner city partnerships, Geoffrey Howe’s 
enterprise zones and Michael Heseltine’s urban development corporation. Two 
decades’ experience of those policies had not substantially improved the city’s 
problems (Parkinson, 1985: 16).
The same can be said over three decades later. From ‘Minister for Merseyside’ Heseltine’s 
International Garden Festival, kickstarting the ‘festivalization’ of urban policy (Peck, 
2017); through more property-led approaches like City Challenge and Housing Market 
Renewal (HMR), whose rationale was concocted in Liverpool; to area-based initiatives 
targeting ‘social exclusion’, such as EU Objective One ‘Pathways to Integration’ and 
New Deal for Communities––all such experiments have mitigated but not significantly 
addressed the city’s deep-seated problems. LCR is still the most deprived of all 39 LEP 
areas in England, while Liverpool and Knowsley are among the most deprived local 
authority areas in the country (respectively ranked fourth and second most deprived 
in 2015) with huge disparities between neighbourhoods (Southern et al., 2017). By the 
time its economic fortunes picked up at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 
city had adopted a distinctive entrepreneurial urbanism. This centred on attracting 
state and EU regeneration subsidies to pursue social inclusion strategies and physical 
renewal (Meegan and Mitchell, 2001; Sykes et al., 2013; North, 2017), and on culture-led 
regeneration and export-oriented growth industries, while its rich history of innovation 
was commodified through spectacles such as the 2008 European Capital of Culture 
(Jones and Wilks-Heeg, 2004). ECoC 2008 was a major boon for the city, responsible for 
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the proliferation of, through increased funding for, grassroots arts-based projects, some 
with socially innovative potential. However, critics contend that this period did more to 
‘capitalize culture’ than democratize or radicalize it for transformative ends; revitalizing 
the city centre but largely overlooking the rest of the city region (Jones and Wilks-Heeg, 
2004; Boland, 2010; O’Brien, 2010).
Through this period, a more ‘capitalocentric’ (Gibson-Graham, 2006) conception 
of innovation took centre stage, informing an approach to local economic development 
focused on exogenous investment and export-oriented innovation industries and large-
scale state-led urban renewal, which, I argue, has largely failed to contend with the 
socio-economic marginalization of most LCR residents. Part of this apparent failure 
reflects a lack of realism in expectations placed on place-based policy solutions to 
problems that are structural in scale (Wilks-Heeg, 2016). Austerity localism has created 
an urban policy vacuum––exacerbated by Brexit––which might be filled by renewed 
experimentation from below (Williams et al., 2014). In this context, social innovations 
are emerging, largely from outside the state and capitalizing on the crisis conditions and 
opportunities opened up post 2008, in multiple neighbourhood-based projects aiming at 
urban transformation. This article explores four such examples, their role in catalysing 
a new economy and the insights they provide for a different approach to local economic 
development and urban policy.
In what follows, I review the literature on social innovation––and its enterprise 
and entrepreneurship counterparts––by contrast with conventional, capitalocentric 
conceptions, exemplified in the LCR Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP)’s Growth 
Strategy. I then tease out the differences between more or less transformative––
maximalist/minimalist––notions of social innovation, and argue for a more maximalist 
understanding. After examining this literature, I explore, through the recent work of 
Graeber (2015), the notions of play and games to throw a different light on transformative 
social innovation––as something rooted in spontaneous creative play. This, I argue, 
comes up against the relative rigidity and path dependency of institutions––the ‘rules 
of the game’ (Lowndes, 2005)––whose dynamic transformation is the object of social 
innovation. The image of a game is a useful construct to show how persistent urban 
problems in LCR––unresolved by conventional game-like, state-led urban policy––
may be tackled more effectively by more playful experiments in social innovation. I 
argue that Liverpool’s policy obsession with entrepreneurial urbanism––including 
entrepreneurialism in securing EU and UK state funding for regeneration programmes–
–has become a self-serving ‘regeneration game’. I ask how we might start playing 
another policy game altogether, one which draws on the creative capacities of resident 
social innovators. Changing the game, however, remains particularly challenging in 
light of the inherent contradictions of social innovation––as a dynamic movement for 
disruptive change seeking to become institutionalized in enduring forms––which makes 
it problematic as a field of action and research and, especially, as a phenomenon for 
urban policy to initiate, cultivate or replicate. In this context, I explore in the discussion 
how urban policy may nonetheless promote and scale up social innovations, and 
suggest how the play–game dialectic provides a constructive framing for understanding 
transformative institutional change.
The article is based partly on doctoral research (2011–15)––a qualitative study 
of Liverpool’s recent history of community-led housing movements, including semi-
structured interviews and participant observation; ongoing action research with 
Homebaked Community Land Trust; an eight-month secondment (February–September 
2016) to the LCR LEP where, as a policy advisor, I gained first-hand insight into 
policymaking processes in helping design and write the so-called Growth Strategy 
(LEP, 2016); as well as more recent empirical research investigating the scale, scope and 
value of the LCR social economy (Heap et al., 2017) and developing an alternative, more 
inclusive industrial strategy for the city region (Southern et al., 2017).
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Contesting capitalocentric conceptions of innovation
Enterprise and entrepreneurialism have long been the discursive domain of 
neoliberal urban policy (Peck, 2017). From the 1980s cities began experimenting with 
new policy approaches to local economic development, such as enterprise zones, which 
foregrounded enterprising and entrepreneurial capacities of the private sector, as 
part of the deregulatory, pro-market logic articulated by neoliberalism and deepened 
through austerity––evident in recent British policy initiatives such as LEPs and 
(resurrected) enterprise zones (Williams et al., 2014). This mirrors more recent policy 
obsessions with creativity––a close relation of innovation––expressed in New Labour’s 
doomed love affair with the ‘creative industries’ and the rise of Richard Florida’s ideas 
around attracting the coveted ‘creative class’ as a panacea to the economic problems of 
deindustrializing cities (Peck, 2005). Similarly, innovation is most commonly associated 
with capitalism––predicated in the popular imagination on technological invention 
and organizational change to produce efficiency gains and new growth opportunities 
(Drewe et al., 2008). Such concepts are reified as post-political ‘floating signifiers’ within 
neoliberal ideology (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014). Across ‘economic’ ideas and 
values, therefore, the dominance of capitalist discourse ensures their close association 
with strictly formal understandings of economic life as essentially competitive and 
individualistic. This is what Gibson-Graham (2006; 2008) describe as ‘capitalocentrism’: 
relating all forms of life to capital, making other practices invisible. In the next section, 
I illustrate how this capitalocentric conception of innovation underpins the hegemonic 
entrepreneurial approach to local economic development in Liverpool, before exploring 
counter-hegemonic conceptions of innovation.
Capitalocentric innovation in Liverpool
In 2015, Liverpool’s two largest universities were commissioned by the LCR 
Combined Authority (CA) to take a barometer reading of the city’s socio-economic 
trajectory, resulting in a lucid diagnosis acknowledging recent achievements towards 
economic recovery yet highlighting enduring problems (Parkinson et al., 2016). The latter 
are summarized starkly as ‘gaps’ with other core cities: notably a wealth gap (£17,852 
gross value added [GVA] per head against £23,755 national average); a jobs gap (lowest 
employment rate of 63 largest UK cities, just 61.2%); and a skills gap (15.9% of working 
age residents lack any formal qualifications, only 25.7% attain high-level qualifications). 
The report also makes recommendations for resolving Liverpool’s severe socio-spatial 
problems built around a rather conventional notion of local economic development 
centring on innovation. ‘Innovation and knowledge are perhaps the most crucial 
characteristic of a successful city region’, states the report, which defines ‘innovation’ as:
The introduction of new or changed processes, services or forms of organisation 
into the market place … Knowledge and innovation are two of the most 
significant drivers of the productivity and competitiveness of city regions 
(Parkinson et al., 2016: 8).
This common conception reduces innovation to a narrowly ‘capitalocentric’ notion: the 
drive for technological change or organizational efficiency in products or production 
processes to improve the competitive position of firms or places in increasingly global 
export markets. This, argues Blake (2010; Blake and Hanson, 2005: 684), results in 
a distinctly place-less idea, in which ‘the concept of innovation has been silently … 
entwined with export-base theory’, as ‘changes in a product or in production that lead 
ultimately to the creation or exploitation of large, extra-local geographic markets’. 
Blake and Hanson (2005) demonstrate how innovation is defined and treated almost 
unanimously across the grey literature as directly related to economic growth. 
Policymaking in Liverpool is no exception.
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‘The state of Liverpool City Region report’ (Parkinson et al., 2016) was highly 
influential in developing the ‘Single growth strategy’ (LEP, 2016). This was commissioned 
by the LCR CA and produced by the LEP to consolidate the multiple overlapping 
strategies across the six constituent LCR local authorities, as an economic guide for 
newly devolved city-regional governance. The single growth strategy highlighted 
seven key ‘growth sectors’––advanced manufacturing; digital and creative; financial 
and professional services; health and life sciences; low carbon energy; maritime and 
logistics; and the visitor economy––those with the most potential for future growth 
through investing in innovation. This orientation towards pursuing highly ‘innovative’ 
industries was already embedded in LEP policy, their Innovation Plan 2014–2020 
bearing all the hallmarks of the place-less notion of innovation:
In seeking to address the structural challenges in the City Region, innovation 
plays a key role in realising wider economic potential. In sophisticated 
market economies, innovation is increasingly the key to success … Innovation 
helps provide the new, fresh thinking, products and services with which our 
businesses, people and place need to meet the challenge of relentlessly 
increasing competition. Innovation also helps us to develop solutions to the 
so-called Grand Societal Challenges of population growth, climate change and 
resource availability (LEP, 2014: 3–4).
Common to the innovation plan and single growth strategy alike, then, is the belief 
that investment in highly innovative industries and other knowledge-intensive 
innovation assets is the most effective way to close the ‘gaps’ identified by The state of 
Liverpool City Region report. However, improving productive and innovative outputs 
of the most successful sectors alone does little to tackle perhaps Liverpool’s biggest 
structural problem: the spatial concentration of unemployment and intergenerational 
deprivation in the inner city and metropolitan periphery. Residents here will continue 
to remain disconnected from job opportunities created by such ‘innovation assets’ 
unless the skills gap and associated social problems are directly targeted. Possibilities 
for addressing these issues are narrowing: for the first time since 1968 the UK lacks an 
urban regeneration policy of targeted area-based initiatives and ‘the outcome is almost 
certain to be that the gap between affluent and deprived neighbourhoods continues to 
grow’ (Wilks-Heeg, 2016: 10). This means more onus on local economic development to 
generate new jobs in places currently disconnected from labour markets. In Liverpool, 
policymakers have chosen the ‘pick the winners’ route to local economic development, 
focusing on high GVA industries with most potential for productivity growth over those 
with greatest capacity for new employment generation or capacity building in areas of 
multiple deprivation. In addition, these high-tech sectors will not produce significant 
new future employment due to technological displacement of human capital, suggesting 
we need to innovate new ways of organizing production in a ‘post-work’ economy 
(Mason, 2015; Srnicek and Williams, 2015). Here, innovation has been conflated with 
productivist growth over other possible interpretations as a source of creative problem 
solving and socio-economic transformation.
Reappropriating innovation
In response to capitalocentric dominance over economic common sense, 
Gibson-Graham argue critical theorizing tends towards ‘strong theory’––a negative, 
paranoid, conspiratorial perspective reducing all phenomena to expressions of 
some fundamental threatening thing, often neoliberalism––and that such ‘reading 
for dominance’, in being blind to difference, ironically reinforces the status quo, 
dampening and discouraging postcapitalist possibilities. Against essentialist ‘strong 
theory’, Gibson-Graham (2008: 619) call for an anti-essentialist ‘weak theory’ to ‘read 
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for difference’, more attuned to the emergence of novelty, possibility and creativity; ‘to 
yield something new’ rather than simply critique. In this way, they embrace innovation 
in their process of theorization and empirical investigation. They build upon Polanyi’s 
(1944) critique of ‘formalist’ economic reductionism––that the dominant, formalist 
view of the economy as a disembedded, self-regulating market composed of exchange 
relations is politically constructed and makes invisible three other principles structuring 
the ‘substantive’ economy: householding, redistribution and reciprocity. Likewise, 
more ‘social’ approaches to enterprise, entrepreneurialism and innovation employ a 
Polanyian method of redescribing apparently strictly ‘economic’ terms. Teasdale (2012) 
describes how growing British policy interest in ‘social enterprise’ was sparked by 
London’s co-operative movement, rooted in more radical anticapitalist and mutualist 
traditions, coming together in the late 1990s to strategically reorganize themselves 
under the moniker of Social Enterprise London; making room for manoeuvre within 
neoliberal discourse. Southern (2014; Southern and Whittam, 2015) deconstructs the 
concept of the enterprising individual––Schumpeter’s ‘heroic’ entrepreneur––and 
rearticulates entrepreneurial behaviour within a collectivist rather than individualist 
frame that emphasizes the co-operative, disruptive and transformative power of the 
‘entrepreneurial activist’. Taken together, social enterprise, social entrepreneurship 
and social innovation help constitute the social and solidarity economy (Scott Cato 
and North, 2017), pointing towards more co-operative economic relations based on the 
Polanyian principles of redistribution and reciprocity rather than exchange.
Likewise, innovation is being disentangled from its capitalist couplings, 
reappropriated for progressive social change (Drewe et al., 2008; Moulaert et al., 2010; 
2013; Avelino et al., 2015; 2017). Characterizing this growing field of social innovation is 
the observation that hegemonic discourse marginalizes broader notions of innovation: 
different ways of thinking; creative problem solving; exploitation of a good idea; artistic 
or intellectual novelty (Blake, 2010). Whilst capitalocentric conceptions conflate 
innovation with invention, contemporary social innovation literature makes a clear-cut 
distinction between ‘invention’––the discovery or creation of a new thing or idea––and 
‘innovation’––the practical application of invention to new contexts (Jessop et al., 2013). 
Distinguishing the social character of innovation is the focus on public interest and 
social empowerment rather than organizational efficiency or technical progress (Drewe 
et al., 2008). Social innovation was first coined in early nineteenth century France 
as a derogatory label criticizing the naivety of early utopian-socialist experiments, 
for ignoring the structural constraints of capitalist dynamics, envisioned by Fourier, 
Saint-Simon and Robert Owen (Moulaert et al., 2013). The concept re-emerged in the 
revolutionary wake of May 1968; French researchers rediscovered the role of everyday 
life and small-scale solutions in social change. This culminated in a reconceptualization 
by Chambon et al. (1982), which formed the foundation for the contemporary 
urban studies strand. These historical origins in French praxis firmly situate social 
innovation in the domain of radical collective action. While the literature suggests 
social innovation begins in reaction to desperate situations––needs being left unmet by 
the state or market––these political origins indicate the missing complementary part 
in the dialectic: proactive and playful visions and imaginaries of how the world could 
be different.
By the twenty-first century, the concept had become bound up with entrepre-
neurialism, increasingly embraced by governments, agencies and think tanks as a policy 
panacea for market failure and public sector reform. We can see this in the Young 
Foundation and NESTA’s championing of distinctly entrepreneurial conceptions in 
the UK, spearheaded by their (former) Chief Executive and New Labour policy guru 
Geoff Mulgan (2007); in the US where Obama instituted a Social Innovation Fund 
and an Office of Social Innovation within the White House (Chalmers, 2012); and 
its incorporation into policymaking in Quebec, Latin America and especially the EU 
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(Avelino et al., 2015). Interestingly, much of the recent research that resuscitates a more 
radical conception has been funded by the EU.
One of these more radical contemporary strands is rooted in urban studies, 
coalescing around the territorial dimension (Drewe et al., 2008; Moulaert et al., 2010; 
Oosterlynck et al., 2013). Neighbourhoods are seen as the increasingly salient site of 
deprivation––spatially-concentrated poverty in marginalized areas suffering from 
market failure and territorial stigma––and its resolution via social innovation in the 
absence of effective state intervention. Largely germinated by Moulaert’s (2000) studies 
into potential planning solutions for ‘disintegrating areas’––post-industrial places 
where orthodox ‘boosterist’ policies have failed––this research was the initiator in 
a series of EU-funded projects conducted in response to growing political concerns 
around uneven urban development and inner-city decline in European cities. The most 
extensive of these was SINGOCOM (‘social innovation governance and community 
building’), running 2001– 06, producing an ‘alternative model of local innovation’ 
(ALMOLIN) (Moulaert et al., 2005), which sought to provide answers to the question: 
‘Can neighbourhoods save the city?’ (Moulaert et al., 2010).
ALMOLIN conceptualizes social innovation dynamics as beginning with 
the deprivation of human needs, differentiated across three domains: economic 
or ‘material’ basic needs (housing, employment etc.); cultural or ‘existential’ needs 
(self-expression, creativity); and ‘political’ needs (participatory citizenship, self-
government) (Moulaert et al., 2005). These deprivations lead to various forms of 
harm––exploitation from material deprivation; alienation from existential; and 
social exclusion from political––which sparks a reaction among affected groups, 
who may, under the right social, institutional and political conditions, mobilize as a 
movement for change. Social innovation then proceeds through three dimensions: 
addressing unmet social needs (‘content’ dimension), requiring ‘changes in social 
relations, especially with regard to governance’ (‘process’), which together––if these 
changes are to remain durable over time––lead to new institutional configurations 
(‘empowerment’) (Moulaert et al., 2005: 1976). This strand positions social innovation 
as driven fundamentally by social movements in civil society pursuing experiments in 
self-organization, often in direct opposition to dominant institutional logics of state 
bureaucracy and market capitalism (Moulaert et al., 2010).
More recently, social innovation has been explored from a ‘sustainability 
transitions’ and ‘systems change’ perspective (Avelino and Wittmayer, 2016). The 
latest EU-funded research project on the subject is TRANSIT (‘transformative social 
innovation theory’), running from 2014 to 2017, with 12 partners across Europe and 
Latin America (Avelino et al., 2015; 2017; Pel and Bauler, 2014). This project takes a 
broader perspective on social innovation as a global network of transformative trans-
local movements. Its greater scope, and its EU funding, reflect growing political interest 
in systemic transformation and various ‘new economies’––‘sharing’, ‘collaborative, 
‘social’, ‘solidarity’, ‘green’, ‘gift’, ‘peer-to-peer’––which all converge around the idea 
that the current dual state-market, public–private system is in escalating crisis and an 
alternative, third direction is progressively navigable. ‘Transformative’ social innovation 
is distinguished as that which ‘contributes to transformative societal change, for example 
towards new economic systems’ (Avelino et al., 2015: 2, original emphasis).
TRANSIT identifies four metanarratives that describe global movements 
towards transformative social innovation: first, ‘degrowth and localization’, focusing on 
ecological justice, low-carbon transitions, circular economies, such as eco villages and 
transition towns; second, ‘social entrepreneurship and the social economy’, focusing on 
connecting and incubating social enterprises through coworking spaces, innovation labs, 
impact hubs, accelerators; third, the ‘collaborative economy’ of sharing and redesigning 
goods through decentralized networks, digital fabrication, open source and peer-to-peer 
technologies and hackerspaces and makerspaces; and fourth, the ‘solidarity economy’, 
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aiming for participatory democracy and political institutional change, including 
movements for a universal basic income, the right to the city, participatory budgeting, 
and collective governance of assets through community land trusts, among others. It is 
this latter metanarrative where we might locate ALMOLIN and the urban studies strand.
Social innovation is a fluid and contested conceptual spectrum––with the Young 
Foundation, NESTA, EU, OECD and Obama’s Office of Social Innovation at one end, and 
those movements studied by ALMOLIN and TRANSIT at the other. With so many diverse 
agents and agendas competing to define its shape and scope, social innovation is––like social 
entrepreneurship––a ‘pre-paradigmatic field’, one whose rationale, problem definition, 
methods and epistemological boundaries are subject to contestation (Nicholls, 2010). Here, 
it is important to distinguish between Unger’s (2015: 236) ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ 
definitions: one confined to the ‘third sector’; the other aiming for change encompassing 
‘the whole of society, of its institutional arrangements, and of its dominant form of 
consciousness’. Similarly, Gorz distinguishes ‘reformist reforms’ from ‘non-reformist 
reforms’ (Meehan, 2014). This echoes Lefebvre’s (1991: 372) notion of postcapitalist 
‘differential space’ and his distinction between ‘induced’/‘minimal’ difference, ‘generated 
by iteration or recurrence’, and ‘produced’/‘maximal’ difference, emerging ‘from the chasm 
opened up when a closed universe ruptures’. This distinction––between ‘capitalocentric’ 
and ‘social’ innovation and, in turn, between conventional and transformative social 
innovation––is encapsulated by Martinez (2016: 224) as two forms of struggle: ‘the struggle 
to succeed according to the values of a particular game and the struggle to decide which 
game is being played’.
This image of a ‘game’ recurs in the TRANSIT literature, which characterizes 
social innovation as a process of change composed of ‘multi-player games’ played by 
various actors and ‘stabilized and channelled by institutions, the rules of the game’ (Pel 
and Bauler, 2014: 2). TRANSIT incorporates the transition dynamics of a multilevel 
perspective to conceptualize transformative change as occurring through various 
interdependent ‘levels’: from the microscale of ‘niches’, places or projects of innovative 
practice; through the mesoscale of ‘regimes’, hegemonic institutional ensembles; to 
the macroscale of the wider ‘landscape’, historical exogenous trends (Avelino et al., 
2017). Transition from one system to another occurs when all three levels coevolve 
and reinforce each other. Thus transformative change transpires through various 
‘shades’ linked to these levels: social innovation within niches, such as particular 
neighbourhoods; system innovation within regime subsystems, such as healthcare or 
housing; and ‘game changers’––‘macro developments that are perceived to drastically 
alter the rules, the fields and the players in the ‘game’ of governance interactions’ (Pel 
and Bauler, 2014: 7). Game changers might include politicoeconomic events, such as the 
2008–9 financial crisis, austerity and Brexit, but may also include longer-term structural 
changes, such as globalization, digital disruption and technological unemployment.
Playing around with the rules of the game
Social innovation, then, is about contesting and experimenting with ‘the rules 
of the game’ that define a particular institutional field (Lowndes, 2005)––or, in a 
Bourdieusian sense, ‘a kind of arena in which people play a game which has certain rules, 
rules which are different from those of the game that is played in the adjacent space’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991: 215). To understand how social innovation might succeed in changing 
the rules of the game it is useful to explore the ‘playing a game’ construct. Graeber (2015: 
191–2) sets out his distinction between play and games:
True, one can play a game; but to speak of ‘play’ does not necessarily imply the 
existence of rules at all. Play can be purely improvisational. One could simply 
be playing around. In this sense, play in its pure form, as distinct from games, 
implies a pure expression of creative energy ... [P]lay can be said to be present 
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when the free expression of creative energies becomes an end in itself. It is 
freedom for its own sake. But this also makes play in a certain sense a higher-
level concept than games: play can create games, it can generate rules––in 
fact, it inevitably does produce at least tacit ones, since sheer random playing 
around soon becomes boring––but therefore by definition play cannot itself be 
intrinsically rule-bound.
When we play games––‘pure rule-governed action’ (Graeber, 2015: 190)––we play 
within the rules set by the game. We are more familiar with playing games, playing 
within the rules, than playing around with them to create new games. The latter is 
what transformative social innovation tends towards. Intuitively, innovation involves 
experimentation or ‘playing around’ with existing configurations; the emergence 
of novelty through creativity. Woodyer (2012: 322) reveals how invention––and by 
extension innovation––is ultimately rooted in playing:
Through its playing with limits, experimentation with rules, roles and meanings, 
and mimetic behaviour, playing contains transformative potential. It is an area 
ripe for rupture, sparks of insight and moments of invention, which presents us 
with ways to be ‘otherwise’.
Graeber (2015) argues that this seemingly unique capacity of play––to bring new things 
into being, create rules for playing games and the conditions for changing them without 
necessarily being bound by them––is shared by only one other social phenomenon: 
sovereignty. In some sense, then, social innovation––in attempting to transform the 
relatively unchanging institutional ensembles that govern urban life through playing 
with the rules of the game––is engaged in the struggle for new kinds of sovereignty. This 
is its most transformative potential. We can see this in more radical emergent social 
innovations prefiguring the logic of the ‘social’, which Davies (2015) conceptualizes as 
a third category of societal organization distinct from the ‘public’ (state/law/normative 
sovereignty/hierarchical relations/‘Leviathan’) and the ‘private’ (market/economics/
spontaneous order/exchange relations/‘Invisible Hand’). Where the state attempts to 
mediate social relations through judicial authority, and the market through calculative 
price mechanisms, the social bypasses these mediations through direct peer-to-
peer interaction, such as via social media (Davies, 2015)––containing both utopian 
and dystopian possibilities for new forms of sovereignty. For instance, Blockchain 
technologies––underpinning cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin––have the potential to 
‘enable modes of large-scale collective action that bear very little resemblance to 
government as we’ve known it’, by circumventing the hegemonic medium of money 
and its ultimate arbiter, state power, through a radically decentralized, accountable and 
transparent digital ledger system (Greenfield, 2017: 161). New production processes 
around digital fabrication––enabled by the technological innovation of 3D printing 
and embodied socially in makerspaces (Greenfield, 2017)––have the potential to short 
circuit capitalism by making the production of commodities approach zero marginal 
cost, thereby undermining the commodity form (Mason, 2015; Srnicek and Williams, 
2015). Makerspaces provide tentative infrastructures for more collaborative production 
(van Holm, 2017) and ‘open innovation’, which transcends closed, vertical control by 
powerful corporations (Chalmers, 2012).
More tangibly, perhaps, common property regimes such as co-ops and community 
land trusts (CLTs) can be seen as institutional articulations of the ‘commons’––a 
manifestation of the social––which transcend our conventional public/private conception 
of ownership and rights (Thompson, 2015). Private property rights are hierarchically 
structured around individual rights bearers related to each other only by their shared 
vertical relationship with the ultimate authority, the state––reflecting the dominance 
PLAYING WITH THE RULES OF THE GAME 11
of what Gilbert (2013) calls the ‘Leviathan logic’ of (neo)liberal political thought since 
Hobbes. The commons represents a break with Leviathan logic, in that commoners are 
related in a horizontal structure where rights are (self-)legitimated through the very 
act of their mutual negotiation (Gilbert, 2013). Reflecting the prefigurative potential 
for creating autonomous collective self-governance, collective property organizations, 
particularly CLTs, have been reconceptualized as ‘governance shims’: ‘(typically nonstate) 
organizations that can act as a wedge [or “shim”] between existing scales’, between the 
household and formal local government (Williams and Pierce, 2017: 796). Their unique 
capacity to own and manage land and resources in a locally democratic and publicly 
accountable way while acting as community anchors––‘stewardship’ over ownership 
(Thompson, 2015)––sets CLTs apart as capable of providing ‘an emergent authority to 
govern’ (Williams and Pierce, 2017: 804, original emphasis). I explore this transformative 
potential through empirical examples below––particularly of CLTs and makerspaces––but 
first draw attention to conceptual limits and fundamental institutional constraints.
The Latin root of innovation suggests ‘novelty’ (Nicholls and Murdock, 2012) 
but novelty always demands a context, just as ‘freedom [play] has to be in tension 
with something [rules], or it’s just randomness’ (Graeber, 2015: 192). In the context 
of urban institutional change there is no blank slate to play with, but rather deeply 
embedded institutional arrangements, cultural norms, material forms and historical 
path dependencies shaping governance practices and processes––the ‘rules of the game’ 
(Lowndes, 2005). While play is dynamic and spontaneous––the sovereign source of 
creativity––institutions appear to be relatively fixed and solid, the vessels of durable 
social reproduction, despite their dynamic nature over time (Lowndes, 2005). Indeed, 
the etymological roots of ‘institution’ indicate something ‘inert’, something standing 
relatively strong and still against the accelerative forces of modernity (Rosa, 2013: 
92)––an inertia set against the dynamic change of innovation. Institutions describe 
‘frameworks of norms, rules and practices which structure action in social contexts’ 
from the most enduring––the labour–capital relation (mode of production) and nuclear 
family unit (social reproduction)––to more historically/contextually contingent and 
progressively malleable governance cultures, processes and practices (González and 
Healey, 2005: 2058). Institutional structures are fundamental for governance and social 
reproduction, and provide the essential material for social innovators to play with; but 
they can be more or less conducive to playful innovation for the production of more or 
less socially just outcomes.
Bureaucracy––the ideal-type form of a rule-based institution––is likened by 
Graeber (2015: 190) to a tightly rule-bound game resistant to play: ‘a bureaucracy is 
anything but playful. Mechanistic and impersonal, it would appear to represent the 
negation of any possibility of playfulness’. My focus here is not on bureaucracy or 
bureaucratic processes per se but on a particular urban policy regime which possesses 
this same tendency of bureaucracy to embody the hallmarks of a game, in opposition to 
play. Graeber (2015: 190) provides a neat definition of an ideal-type game:
First, [games] are clearly bounded in time and space, and thereby framed off 
from ordinary life. There is a field, a board, a starting pistol, a finish line. Within 
that time/space, certain people are designated as players. There are also rules, 
which define precisely what those players can and cannot do. Finally, there 
is always some clear idea of the stakes, of what the players have to do to win 
the game. And, critically: that’s all there is. Any place, person, action, that falls 
outside that framework is extraneous; it doesn’t matter; it’s not part of the game.
Shaped by a prevailing culture of neoliberal entrepreneurialism, the configuration 
of governance processes and policy programmes that has become hegemonic within the 
Liverpool City Region is often described to me by its participants and commentators as 
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‘the regeneration game’. In what follows, I show how it embodies the characteristics of 
a game as set out by Graeber above, exhibiting technocratic tendencies that constrain 
innovation and more playful approaches, becoming self-serving for certain institutional 
players; whose rules prove resilient even in the face of repeated failure to produce 
favourable outcomes, but nonetheless remain possible to transform through path-
breaking social innovation in moments of crisis. In this way, the play–game construct 
can help tease out the dialectics of institutionalizing transformative social innovation 
within urban policy regimes more or less resistant to change.
The image of play and games raises a number of contradictions at the heart of 
social innovation. First, for transformation to occur, new social practices, relations and 
institutional configurations must be innovated through creative acts that have more in 
common with free play than with playing a game. Yet for these new forms to be effective, 
they must endure over time and therefore become institutionalized as new sets of 
rules. This dialectical tension between creative rupture (play) and institutionalization 
(embedding new rules of the game) cannot be fully resolved. The image of free-form 
play versus rule-bound games helps illustrate how social innovation is always pulled in 
opposing directions, with the greater pull from existing rules, making innovative projects 
vulnerable to capture and co-optation before they can sediment as new configurations.
Second, social innovation is torn between free-form play, without bounds, 
as the source of creative social change, and a more instrumental means of problem 
solving in a certain bounded context with specific ends. Graeber (2015: 192) quotes 
Visvanathan, who suggests that ‘A game is a bounded, specific way of problem solving. 
Play is more cosmic and openended ... A game has a predictable resolution, play 
may not. Play allows for emergence, novelty, surprise’. Imagining the institutional 
field of social innovation as a game allows for this contradiction––between play 
and instrumentality––to be held in creative tension: games are there to be played, 
within certain predefined rules, but amenable to change and transformation through 
innovative collective action. However, psychological research (Stokes, 2006) suggests 
that creativity is fundamentally dependent on constraints; that imaginative innovation 
is impossible without at least some boundary making. The play–game tension must 
therefore be seen as an interdependent dialectic rather than outright contradiction, 
whereby creativity paradoxically requires some form of rule setting, problem definition 
and instrumental problem solving. The question remains what institutional conditions 
are most amenable to innovation.
This positions social innovation in an ambiguous relation to a parallel trend 
for ‘urban laboratories’, increasingly mobilized globally as policy solutions to a whole 
range of urban problems (Karvonen and van Heur, 2014). Urban labs mirror the concept 
of innovation in their ubiquity as a contemporary buzzword; a metaphor borrowing 
from experimental science with its rigorous, replicable methods and controlled 
laboratory conditions (Gieryn, 2006). Laboratory studies scholars attempt to collapse 
the distinction between ‘lab’, a placeless site of knowledge production, and ‘field’, highly 
contextual spaces embedded in wider institutional and cultural dynamics (Gieryn, 
2006; Karvonen and van Heur, 2014). However, urban labs encapsulate the central 
tension between top-down policy and grassroots action. While labs are associated 
with conscious experiments conducted by (social) scientists in a bounded site with 
specific instruments, social innovation is a more open-ended and immersive process 
conducted by people living in the experimental ‘site’, the field itself. The deliberate, 
calculated intentionality of laboratories runs against the grain of spontaneous creativity: 
approaching a problem with a pre-chosen methodology and set of tools conspires 
against the production of novelty. Their instrumentality as bounded spaces of scientific 
investigation suggests urban labs tend to, in a Lefebvrean sense, induce differences 
within a closed universe of rules rather than produce maximal difference through their 
rupture. When social innovation becomes more systematic, deliberately programmed 
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and externally induced by researchers or policymakers it begins to take on the character 
of an urban lab.
This helps explain why so much social innovation literature––notably the urban 
studies strand (Moulaert et al., 2010)––locates its source in everyday life, civil society 
and social movements, outside and opposing the state and market. Such a position 
resonates with Scott’s (1999) critique of the technocratic logic embodied in ‘seeing 
like a state’––parasitic on and stifling more informal, playful processes of everyday 
life. As a counterbalance to abstract knowledge, episteme, and technical knowledge, 
techne––both embodied in state projects and scientific labs, and relatively impervious 
to context––Scott (1999) posits mêtis: vernacular practical wisdom and knowhow, 
acquired in response to contextual challenges. Social innovation aligns most closely 
with mêtis––but ideally mobilizes all three approaches to knowledge production. This 
is captured in ‘trans-disciplinarity’, methodologically central to social innovation 
research (Jessop et al., 2013), which reconfigures the role of the researcher towards 
highly reflexive, embedded and politically oriented participatory action research, 
working closely with both practitioners (techne) and residents (mêtis); breaking down 
traditional boundaries between theory/practice, observer/observed, expert/user, 
science/art, top-down/bottom-up, induced/produced, and instrumentality/play.
Along transdisciplinary lines, the TRANSIT literature takes a multi-actor 
approach (Avelino and Wittmayer, 2016) that sees social innovation emerging through 
distributed agency, ‘initiated by any kind of actor, in any kind of context’ (Avelino 
et al., 2017: 5). Although, problematically, this disavows the unique contribution of 
civil society actors, it nonetheless recognizes the importance of forging alliances 
between active agents of innovation––the ‘bees’, in Mulgan’s (2007) famous ecological 
metaphor––and the ‘trees’, those institutional agents of validation, such as universities, 
companies, local authorities and other ‘anchor institutions’; alternately articulated as 
the ‘butterflies’ and the ‘elephants’ (Oosterlynck et al., 2013). Moreover, it recognizes 
that agents of social innovation are distributed across different sectors. Building on 
social enterprise/entrepreneurship scholarship, the TRANSIT literature identifies four 
main institutional logics: ‘state’ (public, formal, nonprofit), which can be translated, in 
Polanyian terms, as the redistribution principle; ‘market’ (private, formal, for profit), as 
exchange; ‘community’ (private, informal, nonprofit), as reciprocity; and a hybrid ‘third 
sector’ of nonprofit associations (private, formal, nonprofit), balanced between all three 
principles. Because of its disruptive potential to reconfigure these sectoral relations––and 
its preparadigmatic, unstable identity as a ‘boundary concept’, sufficiently flexible to 
bridge social worlds (Pel and Bauler, 2014)––social innovation most likely emerges from 
the interstitial spaces between institutional fields, before becoming institutionalized, 
often in the third sector. Highly transformative social innovation, however, succeeds in 
reconfiguring these institutional logics before becoming captured by them, moving from 
‘niches’ situated within particular fields and places towards ‘regime’ change. In the next 
section, I discuss how this institutionalization process has played out in Liverpool, in the 
governance context of the dominant game in town, the ‘regeneration game’.
Playing the regeneration game in Liverpool
In the late 1990s, inner-city Liverpool––like many deindustrializing north-
ern English cities –experienced severe manifestations of economic decline in low 
demand, housing vacancy and neighbourhood abandonment. Liverpool City Council 
commissioned the original research of ‘neighbourhood sustainability’ that underpinned 
their successful lobbying for the entire Housing Market Renewal (HMR) Pathfinder 
programme across nine northern cities––£2.3 billion funding from central government 
(Webb, 2011). Certain actors were designated as legitimate players to work across the 
city region’s four ‘zones of opportunity’––intriguingly known as ZOOs (Thompson, 
2017)––in which preferred housing associations and private sector developers worked 
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in partnership with the council. ‘Land banks’ were created through large-scale zoning 
with sufficient economies of scale to make redevelopment viable and profitable for the 
main players, but preventing any experimentation outside the rules of the game imposed 
by the monolithic development logic. According to one regeneration consultant, these 
zones were like a ‘chessboard’ of strategic land parcels, to be divested of residents so 
that development players may ‘shift pieces around’ according to changing dynamics of 
the ‘regeneration game’ (interview, 2015).
Here, we see striking similarities with playing a game, as defined by Graeber 
(see quote above). Just as in a game of, say, monopoly or chess, a regeneration scheme 
zones an urban area off from ordinary life and bespoke rules govern how players can 
act, especially in relation to property, such as state-imposed compulsory purchase 
orders (CPOs), while foreclosing other ways of acting. And just like a board game, there 
are a number of predefined players, some understanding the rules of the game better 
than others or better placed to capitalize on a good starting position, creating unequal 
chances for winning or losing. Indeed, the ‘regeneration game’ metaphor has long held 
currency in describing various area-based initiatives (de Groot, 1992; Oatley, 1995).
In the case of Liverpool’s HMR Pathfinder, powerful players determined the 
rules of the game. The council had a direct financial interest to sell land recouped 
through CPO to developers and housing associations, pocketing the difference and 
generating higher council tax revenues in the long run (Thompson, 2017). Likewise, 
housing associations had a financial stake in seeing their assets revalorized; their 
ability to borrow private finance for housing development is based on the value of 
their stock, which in inner-city Liverpool at the time was very low, producing perverse 
incentives to deliberately run-down areas to demonstrate their need for regeneration 
subsidies (Webb, 2011). This state-led process of exacerbating the very territorial stigma 
then targeted through regeneration is beginning to be documented elsewhere, notably 
Edinburgh (Kallin and Slater, 2014). Despite HMR being cancelled midway through its 
proposed programme in 2011 by the incoming coalition government, there are now, in 
the context of fiscal austerity, greater incentives to continue asset stripping to plug the 
widening gap in funding for basic pubic services following some 58% budget cuts to 
Liverpool City Council.
The ‘regeneration game’ is a term employed by actors in Liverpool to describe 
more than just time-restricted, spatially bounded renewal projects. A former housing 
officer and regeneration consultant turned social entrepreneur explains:
I talk about the index of multiple deprivation … Liverpool’s been really good 
at winning that competition, because we can attract EU-backed money … It’s a 
money competition really, so we’ve come top of that tree for a long time. But 
now that competition’s changed, it’ll be interesting to see what the city does, 
because it’s a quite an entrepreneurial city in its own way … Maybe people 
have been misunderstanding what game, what league, Liverpool was playing 
in, because actually if the biggest prize was European money, we won it … Who 
else was gonna invest that much in the city? We not only got Objective One, 
we got it for three decades on the trot and the [HMR] transition programme: 
no other city’s got that have they! … So you could even describe it as the most 
entrepreneurial city––even Canary Wharf didn’t get as much as us in terms of 
European investment (interview, 2014).
While providing a much-needed source of external support for Liverpool and 
its most marginalized residents, EU Objective One funding had problematic effects on 
the city’s social innovation experiments. Through the 1990s, they became increasingly 
geared towards addressing top-down policy objectives around social exclusion and thus 
more ‘minimalist’ in orientation. Out of the massive EU Structural Funds investment 
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through the Objective One ‘Pathways to Integration’ programme, worth around £140 
million, Liverpool Council implemented the Community-based Economic Development 
(CBED) programme in 1994 as a way to stimulate alternative employment creation 
consolidating a new network of social enterprises (Meegan and Mitchell, 2001). Since 
then, the transformative potential of social innovation has been constricted by further 
institutionalization and neoliberal reforms––creating a cottage industry of infrastructure 
support organizations and financial intermediaries in the city region––coupled with the 
gradual tightening of the social ‘sector’ around the New Labour agenda of ameliorating 
social exclusion (Teasdale, 2012). This co-optation of original principles reflects the 
calcification entailed through any process of ‘scaling up’ and institutionalization (Pel 
and Bauler, 2014); and the organizational isomorphism brought about by interaction 
and reliance on more powerful institutional logics, increasingly adopted by socially 
innovative projects in order to grow and embed themselves within existing regimes 
(Nicholls, 2010). In parallel to this process, LCR’s tradition of social innovation has 
largely been forgotten, marginalized or else straightjacketed by the ‘regeneration game’.
The regeneration game imposes perverse incentive structures that run against 
the grain of everyday life, as disclosed by this anti-HMR activist and resident of Anfield, 
a neighbourhood incurring huge demolitions:
There was a big pot of gold ... In order to access this pot, the area had to tick 
so many boxes in the magical world of deprivation. So suddenly, we were told 
all the time that we were from this deprived area. And we were like ‘I’m not 
deprived. I don’t feel deprived. We have food and clothes, both parents work. 
How am I deprived?’ But the more you feed that in: ‘You’re poor, you’re this, 
you’re that’, you watch the standards drop; everything seemed to drop and it 
took about ten years, but they finally ticked that last box (quoted in Heeswijk 
and Jurgensen, 2014).
Anfield (L4) has been described by its inhabitants as a ‘postcode with clinical 
depression’, as ‘people began to think of themselves in the same terms that had 
been used to describe their neighbourhood’ (Southern and Whittam, 2015: 95). The 
social entrepreneur quoted above suggests thereafter the need to move away from 
‘competing in the Indices of Multiple Deprivation’––that is, the more poverty and 
dereliction demonstrated as ‘evidence’, the more funding received from EU/state 
programmes––towards playing the ‘indices of multiple celebration!’ This points to 
the emergence in the city of more positive, creative, forward-looking and socially 
innovative approaches to local economic development beginning to supersede more 
negative approaches that focus on problems, absences and exclusions in a ‘glass 
half-empty’ mentality (North, 2017) which, following Gibson-Graham (2008), is self-
defeating––reading for dominance rather than difference.
Since the dominant games in town––export-oriented innovation, culture-led 
entrepreneurialism and the regeneration game, including those community projects 
and social enterprises funded through EU Objective One––have not made significant 
headway with resolving severe socio-economic problems, there is a rationale for 
experimenting with new approaches that might make more of a difference. In the next 
section, I explore four related case studies that potentially represent transformative 
social innovations, before drawing out in the conclusion the implications for LCR urban 
policy and social innovation theory more generally.
From the index of multiple deprivation to indices of multiple celebration
First, Homebaked, an arts-led regeneration project emerged in Anfield to 
contest its ‘clinical depression’, specifically HMR demolition of a Victorian terraced 
row opposite Liverpool FC’s stadium. Homebaked began as a public arts project 
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commissioned by the 2010 Liverpool Biennial––an arts exhibition organization founded 
in 1998 during the ascendance of culture-led regeneration (O’Brien, 2010)––whose 
organizers invited internationally acclaimed Dutch artist Jeanne van Heeswijk to 
work with local residents to address the effects of HMR on lived experience (Liverpool 
Biennial, 2015). Out of initial interactions with residents, Jeanne created 2Up2Down, a 
community-led participatory design project to reimagine Anfield’s future, constructed 
through small-scale community-led alternatives to top-down planning programmes like 
HMR: a way for local people to ‘co-produce their own futures’ and ‘make real social and 
physical change in their neighbourhood’, in a participatory action research process van 
Heeswijk calls ‘radicalising the local’, by way of ‘empowering communities to become 
their own antidote’ (Heeswijk and Jurgensen, 2014).
Following residents’ mobilization into the project, Homebaked Community Land 
Trust (CLT) was born, with an independent co-operative bakery and café sited below 
affordable community-owned housing. It has become an important community anchor 
sharing the same name, acting as a meeting point and source of social support for local 
people, many with multiple needs. Homebaked run regular training events and use a 
mentoring scheme for local volunteers who have learning difficulties or mental health 
issues, and who can work in the bakery without resorting to their special support allowance. 
The CLT is now a partner in the council’s wider regeneration plans for ‘Anfield Village’, with 
a vision to regenerate the local high street, involving a new public square for experimental 
cultural uses, a food-growing project called Homefarm and incubation units for other 
community businesses, reinvesting any surpluses back into the local economy. Homebaked’s 
slogan is ‘brick by brick, loaf by loaf, we build ourselves’––developing a new holistic 
community-based economy, in which economic activity is deeply embedded in local life.
Second, in Granby, another inner-city neighbourhood targeted by HMR, a 
successful resident-led anti-demolition campaign evolved into a playful vision centred 
on the Granby Four Streets CLT––famous for being the first housing, regeneration 
or architecture project ever to win the prestigious Turner Prize, in 2015. Having 
saved hundreds of houses from demolition to be rehabilitated for community use, the 
CLT campaign began with residents subverting images of dereliction and enforced 
eviction with colourful art and murals; reclaiming their streets from what many saw 
as ‘dereliction by design’, through guerrilla gardening and a monthly street market, 
where residents celebrate together with live music and street food (Thompson, 2015). 
An indicative graffito on one of the buildings, which plays on the more familiar sign 
‘ALL BALL GAMES ARE PROHIBITED’, bears instead an open invitation: ‘GAMES 
(PLEASE)’. Granby Four Street’s architects Assemble are a collective of do-it-yourself 
enthusiasts who work closely with the community to coproduce designs and renovations. 
Capitalizing on their Turner Prize success, they established the Granby Workshop, a 
social enterprise employing local artists and young people to reclaim materials and 
design new furniture and fittings as products for rehabilitated houses and sale online. 
It also provides training for residents to renovate their own homes. Though only a small 
step towards local economic recovery, this demonstrates the power of playful social 
innovation, initiated in reaction to the regeneration game.
The CLT model is often cited as a ‘social innovation for reinventing real 
estate’ (Midheme, 2013; Meehan, 2014). CLTs were first innovated by the US civil 
rights movement in the 1960s to promote black property ownership; since gaining 
popularity among activists and policymakers as a tool for providing affordable housing 
for local people, owned and managed democratically by the community rather than the 
state or absentee private landlords. Granby and Homebaked are among the first urban 
CLTs in the UK; pioneering the application of the CLT model to problems associated 
with disinvestment, neglect and urban decline rather than financial speculation and 
gentrification; and for more transformative ends other than just provision of affordable 
housing.
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Third, The Beautiful North project was created by a range of governance actors 
to change perceptions of north Liverpool and from it emerged The Beautiful Ideas Co. 
(CLES, 2016). This Community Interest Company (CIC)––the relatively new British 
legal form for social enterprises––has secured the rights to the revenues generated by a 
temporary match-day car park for football fans. These revenues are reinvested in social 
innovation through The Beautiful Ideas Co. Launchpad, which invited local people to 
imagine new forms of local economic development to be applied collaboratively for social 
impact in north Liverpool, in an ideas competition funding 10–15 projects ranging from 
£300 to £30,000. The car park money is matched by £375,000 from central government’s 
Public Sector Launchpad Accelerator. The creativity of north Liverpool communities is 
demonstrated by some 70 applications received by the January 2016 closing date.
Distinguishing Beautiful Ideas Co. from other small-scale incubators is their 
emphasis on relationships over contractual obligations. They work closely with 
applicants to scale up ideas into viable projects. Loans are offered at incredibly 
low interest rates and only repayable if the enterprise is successful; written off if 
unsuccessful; with an option to repay in social value rather than financial return. A 
revenue participation agreement entitles Beautiful Ideas Co. to 1% of total revenues, 
although this is capped at £10,000. The Beautiful Ideas Co. see this model of ‘patient 
capital’ as a means to inspire a different type of business mentality, one that contrasts 
with both exploitative commercial loan regimes and dependent grant culture, suggesting 
that ‘the model breeds success through handshakes, not handouts’; that collaboration, 
co-operation, trust and an ‘infectious energy’ circulate outwards into communities ‘like 
a handshake passing on’ (interview, 2017). While still very much an entrepreneurial 
form of capitalism, ‘patient capital’ returns to the Latin root of ‘credit’: ‘credo’; ‘to believe 
in and trust’––positioning it as part of the co-operative ethical banking movement 
(Bollier and Conaty, 2015).
Fourth, the first recipient of The Beautiful Ideas Co. Launchpad is Make 
Liverpool CIC, which was awarded £30,000 to renovate an old industrial unit in the 
north docks into a ‘makerspace’, a hub and coworking space for anyone––budding 
artists, builders, carpenters, designers, photographers, among others––to use collective 
tools and equipment. Make Liverpool are taking over a large space formerly home to 
an ambulance manufacturer and are hoping to build on local traditions of craft and 
manufacture, but focusing on emerging trends in the new economy, such as digital 
fabrication and 3D printing (van Holm, 2017). Just like the successful Baltic Creative CIC 
in the Baltic Triangle in the south docks––now the fashionable epicentre of Liverpool’s 
digital, sonic and computer gaming industries––Make Liverpool will reinvest all rental 
surpluses into infrastructure for further local economic development. The hope is to 
stimulate new employment for not just young people, but older workers who lost their 
jobs with the decline of the docks.
Significantly, Make Liverpool is located in the ‘Ten Streets’ of run-down 
warehouses immediately behind the docks now designated as Liverpool Waters 
Enterprise Zone. While almost no redevelopment or economic activity has occurred 
in the enterprise zone since its inception in 2012, the Ten Streets are fast becoming a 
vital hub of new activity as creative companies and social organizations take advantage 
of cheap rents and large premises. Liverpool City Council has officially backed the Ten 
Streets as north Liverpool’s ‘Cultural Enterprise Industry Hub’ to mimic the Baltic 
Triangle in the south. Meanwhile, the enterprise zone awaits commencement of a 
longstanding regeneration scheme by Peel Holdings, LCR’s largest private property 
owner and progenitor of the ambitious Atlantic Gateway vision, aiming to develop 
Peel-owned land along the Manchester–Liverpool Ship Canal corridor, in the UK’s first 
significant private-led regional development strategy (Haughton and Allmendinger, 
2015). The stark contrast in progress between Liverpool Waters and Make Liverpool 
hints at Liverpool’s economic future.
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Discussion: how transformative, really?
The four cases presented above represent small ‘niches’ within a wider game 
of transformative social innovation (Pel and Bauler, 2014; Avelino et al., 2017). The 
challenge for niches like these is to translate discrete transformations in particular 
projects at the neighbourhood scale into transformations of regime subsystems at 
the city–regional/national scale, be that affordable housing or business development, 
and systemic change at a societal level. The CLT campaigns are beginning to provoke 
change in this direction, albeit slowly. Taking land off the market and into democratic 
local control is a potentially revolutionary move in land ownership––one which could 
transcend the conventional public/state–private/market binary. NESTA (2017) recently 
recognized both Homebaked and Granby as among 50 ‘new radicals’––radically socially 
innovative ‘projects which, if scaled, could transform the lives of millions of people, and 
offer us a glimpse of a different kind of society’. Granby was shortlisted as a finalist in this 
year’s BSHF-UN World Habitat Awards. Their growing media profiles may help them 
influence policy at city-regional and national scales, while inspiring replication through 
global trans-local networks. Likewise, The Beautiful Ideas Co. represents a radically new 
method of incubating and funding social entrepreneurship. Their particular brand of 
‘patient capital’ is in many ways a reinvention of capitalism, restricting capital lending 
to socially productive nonprofit investment, limiting neoliberal financialization.
The big ‘game changers’ shaping these four projects are the 2008–9 financial 
crisis, precipitating the onset of austerity and the end of the ‘regeneration game’; Brexit, 
which threatens to further curtail EU funding and leave Liverpool more vulnerable 
to global economic forces; and impending technological unemployment wrought 
by digital disruption. While the CLTs have capitalized on the first of these game 
changers––the policy vacuum opened up by the withdrawal of HMR funding––The 
Beautiful Ideas Co. and in particular Make Liverpool can be seen as early solutions to 
the latter, anticipating the changes wrought by new manufacturing technologies and 
more open and collaborative production. Makerspaces, in which digital fabrication 
technologies are being refined, have a potentially big role to play in future local 
economic development (Greenfield, 2017; van Holm, 2017) and are a key part of the 
‘collaborative economy’, one of the four global movements of transformative social 
innovation identified by the TRANSIT literature (Avelino et al., 2015). Likewise, The 
Beautiful Ideas Co. is a member of a global network called Hub Launchpad, part of a 
growing movement of social entrepreneurs––another of the TRANSIT metanarratives. 
However, there are risks that with the rise of metropolitan coworking spaces with 
names like ‘innovation hubs’ and ‘incubation labs’, which purportedly encourage 
creative cross fertilization of ideas among socially minded entrepreneurs, parts of the 
movement are losing their political rationale and becoming a ‘playground for the rich’ 
(Steiner and Teasdale, 2016). Indeed, makerspaces tend to be used mostly by white, 
male and highly educated makers (van Holm, 2017). There is an important role, then, 
for the Polanyian domain of (state) redistribution as well as (grassroots/associational) 
reciprocity in developing social innovation: reciprocity requires redistribution for 
social innovation to flourish without reproducing existing inequalities.
The four case studies provide interesting insights into how transformative social 
innovations are catalysed and developed. Supporting the urban studies strand, the CLT 
projects were galvanized by anti-demolition campaigning among citizens in opposition 
to the state––an alliance of the directly deprived/dispossessed with the alienated/
disillusioned (Moulaert et al., 2010). This lends empirical support to the thesis that 
social innovation tends to begin with political resistance. Both were heavily reliant on 
artists, activists and practitioners from outside the neighbourhoods and often from other 
institutional fields, notably the third sector. Moreover, the evolution of both projects 
proceeded through close interplays between different institutional logics, collapsing or 
blurring their boundaries. For instance, Granby’s architects live onsite in a CLT-owned 
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house while they work with residents to develop and hone tools and methods on the job, 
breaking down boundaries between professional/amateur, expert/user, design studio/
site; representing a distinctly transdisciplinary method of social innovation. Likewise, 
The Beautiful Ideas Co. originated through a partnership approach between councillors, 
activists, housing professionals and other stakeholders––a coming together of various 
institutional logics, supporting the TRANSIT multi-actor perspective (Avelino and 
Wittmayer, 2016). This was a more proactive endeavour that sought to collaborate with 
the state from the outset––demonstrating how social innovation contains a wide range 
of relatively more or less oppositional approaches to the state and market. In all cases, 
there are concerns over which class interests the leading social innovators represent, 
and how far their claims––that these social innovations empower other residents lacking 
their privileged access to cultural capital, professional knowledge and resources––can 
be substantiated. All cases eventually attracted the support of influential voices in the 
city region. This raises questions over the relationship between social innovation and 
political resistance: how politically subversive and disruptive acts are legitimated as 
playful acts of innovation, repositioned to gain traction in policy discourses; how far 
this translation process is facilitated through the role of powerful supporters in lending 
legitimacy; and what this means for less privileged communities of social innovators 
who, without such a voice, may be dismissed as ‘unruly’ rather than ‘creative’.
The high-profile success of these projects highlights the deeply uneven urban 
geography and polarized politics of social innovation. These projects are all located 
in deprived neighbourhoods that have suffered severe, and therefore more obvious, 
urban decline, often with a long history of community organizing, or else attracting the 
attention of social innovators for being at the centre of controversial urban policies like 
HMR. Moreover, state funding and support have been incredibly important in each case. 
The ten houses codesigned, restored and now owned and managed by Granby CLT as 
affordable local homes were originally gifted by the City Council; while Homebaked was 
catalysed by Liverpool Biennial public arts funding. The Beautiful Ideas Co. received 
state investment through two sources: the car park leased from the Council, and the 
match funding from the Public Sector Launchpad Accelerator. Again, this underscores 
the importance of the state as an ally and crucial collaborator in the development of 
social innovation, despite the threat posed to its transformative potential by institutional 
capture and isomorphism. But it also raises troubling spatial justice questions: who 
decides where scarce public resources get spent; should certain areas deserve to receive 
special treatment simply because they have the creative capacity to attract it; what 
happens to those communities which lack the social and cultural capital to perform 
feats of civic volunteerism, or else are located outside the limelight cast by spectacular 
urban dereliction, marginalized from academic, policy and media attention as well as 
economic resources?
Such political questions are joined by more practical problems. In Liverpool, 
policymakers are slowly attuning to more socially innovative urban policy. After years 
of struggling to get the council to take their proposal seriously, Granby Four Streets 
CLT has finally won approval: Cabinet Member for Housing, Ann O’Byrne, publicly 
stating that ‘Granby Four Streets is at the forefront of the Urban Community Land Trust 
movement in the North West––and we are proud to support it’. The council’s aspirations 
for a ‘Cultural Enterprise Industry Hub’ in the Ten Streets is another example of this 
reorientation towards more socially innovative policymaking. However, there are 
already problematic implications. Make Liverpool and other social entrepreneurs in the 
area are concerned about the potential rise in rents and threat of property speculation 
arising from the council’s designation. This highlights the contradictions of urban policy 
support, which often acts to accelerate processes of commodification and incorporation 
into neoliberal urbanism as opposed to incubating more disruptive or transformative 
social innovation.
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These difficulties of incorporating into urban policy potentially transformative 
social innovations run deep in structural path dependencies and perverse incentive 
structures. Financial and political stakes in the ‘regeneration game’––in Liverpool 
and elsewhere (Kallin and Slater, 2014)––are deepened by austerity and the desperate 
need for local authorities to find new sources of funding to keep basic public services 
running, even resorting to selling off public assets and exploiting the rent gap. However, 
local authorities and regeneration partnerships are only playing the hand dealt them 
by exogenous game changers, such as nationally coordinated austerity and global 
economic restructuring. The rules of the regeneration game are not set locally or 
democratically––that is part of the problem. At a recent event on alternative city 
economies hosted at Make Liverpool, one delegate accused local government of failing 
to ‘keep up with the changes taking place ‘at the pace of imagination’ on the ground’ 
(CLES, 2016). The resulting report highlights a ‘glass floor’ preventing local state 
and market actors from connecting with the creative small-scale solutions occurring 
beneath their radar. Indeed, Peel Holding’s refusal to engage with social innovators and 
their alternative ideas for the Liverpool Waters enterprise zone is indicative of a more 
general reluctance among big development players. This is not something attributable 
only to local government or corporations like Peel; this relates to the activities of all 
anchor institutions, including universities.
For social innovation to really make an impact in Liverpool, or indeed elsewhere, 
the support of anchor institutions, especially universities, is critical. In places where the 
social and solidarity economy is most successful and institutionalized, such as Quebec, 
Canada, and parts of Brazil and Argentina, universities are more active players (Scott 
Cato and North, 2017). Brazilian universities have been instrumental in developing ‘social 
economic incubators’ in low-income communities for the incubation and facilitation of 
‘solidarity economic ventures’, which are co-operative and self-managed enterprises 
bringing new work, income and practical solutions to many favelas. These incubators 
are led by multidisciplinary teams of academics, students and practitioners who work 
closely with communities to develop ‘social technology’––a hybrid of techne and mêtis 
perhaps. A similarly active role for universities is evident in the Community–University 
Research Alliance in Quebec. These represent a ‘transdisciplinary’ method for social 
innovation, whereby universities explicitly focus on the task of developing capacities 
for economic self-management and finding action-research solutions to urban problems; 
and importantly, facilitate exchange of academic (episteme), technical (techne) and 
popular (mêtis) knowledge through mutual learning. Assemble are doing something 
comparable in Granby, but without the support of anchor institutions. The question 
remains: what could be done with their support?
However, it must be recognized that the institutional structures of universities 
are not currently configured in ways conducive to the transdisciplinary production 
of social innovation. Universities in the UK at least are severely constrained by the 
hierarchical and competitive norms that govern the production of knowledge and 
their increasing marketization through such mechanisms as the Research Excellence 
Framework, the impact agenda and reliance on students as ‘customers’. For socially 
innovative experiments to flourish through the support of universities, transformative 
innovation should be channelled internally, at university institutional structures, as 
much as externally into action-research projects.
In Liverpool, practical steps to be undertaken that draw on the resources of 
‘trees’ and ‘elephants’ to support ‘bees’ and ‘butterflies’ (Mulgan, 2007; Oosterlynck et 
al., 2013) might include digital mapping of all existing and potential social innovation 
assets, led by action researchers within universities. A first attempt at this for the 
LCR social economy has been completed by the Heseltine Institute for Public Policy 
and Practice (Heap et al., 2017) in collaboration with the Social Economy Panel, a 
group of leading local practitioners. This could be replicated at a deeper level for the 
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collaborative and solidarity economies, as has been done elsewhere (Safri, 2014), as a 
means to identify and connect up social innovative projects, for their further interaction, 
collaboration and mutual support. Such a mapping exercise would aim to produce an 
open source digital platform for projects to network, communicate, learn from each 
other, attract sources of support and generate wider citizen participation. Establishing 
a democratically representative body at the emerging city-regional governance scale, in 
the LEP, CA and newly elected Metro Mayor’s Office, would constitute a further step in 
this process. Out of these networks, ‘solidarity markets’ may develop between socially 
innovative projects which, if sufficiently scaled, could create new, alternative avenues of 
production and consumption prefiguring a postcapitalist economy (Miller, 2013).
A more systematic approach for the development of transformative social 
innovation would be to create new polycentric systems of governance of the commons 
(Foster and Iaione, 2016). This might involve experimenting with an Office for 
Civic Imagination, drawing on the successful prototype in Bologna, where a ‘co-city 
protocol’ and ‘co-laboratory’ have been initiated by action researchers to innovate 
new, collaborative and radically participatory forms of urban governance, in which 
citizens play a central role in developing imaginative projects for governing common 
resources, such as unused land, empty buildings, green space, infrastructure and public 
services (Foster and Iaione, 2016). This could build upon the emerging infrastructure 
of community anchor organizations, including Granby and Homebaked CLTs and The 
Beautiful ideas Co., which already act as hubs within deprived neighbourhoods for 
multiple functions: providing community meeting space, incubating social enterprise, 
managing collective housing and public space, and initiating community-led urban 
regeneration. Such governance ‘shims’ (Williams and Pierce, 2017) could become the 
nodes of a city-regional network of social innovation incubation and urban commons 
governance, coordinated democratically by a civic platform, an Office for Civic 
Imagination, supported by academic researchers and practitioners, and acting as a 
conduit through to devolved city-regional governance.
Conclusion
As Liverpool’s recent history attests, limitations of successive state-led 
experiments––from area-based initiatives to enterprise zones––reflects the gradual 
tightening and exhaustion of policy innovation within an ever-mutating neoliberalizing 
urban regime: the trend ‘towards competitively induced conditions of constrained 
institutional searching and experimentality, yielding a narrowing of development 
agendas, imaginaries and pathways’ (Peck, 2017: 12). Now under austerity localism, 
the UK government, following HMR’s premature cancellation in 2011, has all but 
abandoned area-based regeneration policy (Wilks-Heeg, 2016). In this context, social 
innovation represents both a widening of imaginaries and possible pathways, in its 
transformative potential, and a narrowing of political ambition, if it is indeed held up as 
an alternative to targeted state support. The ‘return of social government’––replacing 
old ‘socials’ (security/policy/services) with new (enterprise/entrepreneurship/
innovation/media)––is one way to inject capitalist dynamism back into a system fast 
exhausting its productive and creative capacities (Davies, 2015). Social innovation, then, 
contains highly contradictory dynamics and divergent political possibilities: embodying 
simultaneously an instrumental problem-solving strategy as an outsourced response 
to urban policy failure as well as a more expansive, playful, maximalist approach to 
innovating new institutions and political configurations that may help transform how, 
in a Polanyian sense, we see and reproduce the economy.
In this article, I have offered up play and games––borrowing from Graeber––as 
an original heuristic to create a different, potentially fruitful vantage point to frame and 
explore the contradictions and possibilities around institutionalizing transformative 
social innovation. The metaphor allows for certain state-led urban policy programmes 
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to be seen as a ‘regeneration game’, whose rules often foreclose more playful 
experimentation in the form of citizen-led social innovation. There are a number of 
overlapping senses in which social innovation incorporates elements of play: first, within 
projects themselves, by embodying play in socially innovative practices; second, by 
employing playful tactics in resisting and subverting the rules of the game; and, third, in 
developing and institutionalizing more playful approaches to urban governance, whose 
rules enable urban transformation. The first and second remain an interesting avenue 
for future research, contributing to an emerging field of ‘ludic geographies’ (Woodyer, 
2012). Indeed, many of the case studies presented embody play in their practices and 
tactics; but it was mainly the third sense that concerned me here.
The play–games dialectic thus illuminates the ‘constant interplay between 
creativity and codification’ that the radical economist and social innovator, the late Robin 
Murray, diagnosed as animating successful industries (Murray et al., 2015: 196). This 
dialectic can be restated as that between social innovation and institutional configuration; 
between agency and structure; or, in Marxian terms, living and dead labour. Murray’s 
warning––that ‘[t]he moment you lose the tacit, living labour, the codification atrophies’ 
(ibid.)––is a useful reminder of the fragile dialectical balance between creativity and 
codification and the ease with which it can be lost as socially innovative experiments 
seek to scale up their activities and institutionalize their practices. The issue of scale 
is fundamental here. For place-based experiments working across various domains 
to flourish and eventually transform urban economies, those institutions that provide 
essential financial and legal support and political legitimation––from universities and 
other local ‘anchor institutions’ to legislative, funding and regulatory regimes––must 
also be transformed, their institutional codes played around with, to enable social 
innovations to replicate and grow without succumbing to isomorphism.
The legal domain––so often overlooked by political economists and critical 
urban geographers, myself included––should be highlighted as a mediating and 
adaptive institutional infrastructure that creates the pathways for innovation to occur 
just as much as it controls and closes down others. Theorists are now calling for 
the development of ‘social law’ (Davies, 2013) and ‘radical transactionalism’, where 
‘legal building blocks of property and capital can be reimagined and reconfigured’ for 
supporting co-operative rather than financialized economic models (Morgan and Kuch, 
2015: 586). The law has likewise been likened to a game, for its ‘game-like’ characteristics 
(ibid.), suggesting that the play–game dialectic might be a useful construct for critical 
legal studies as well as urban scholars and institutionalists. Davies (2013: 220) sees 
institutions as ‘shared illusions with real effects’ underwritten by law, and asks why so 
much social entrepreneurship (and social innovation) but so little social law? In the 
UK, the legal innovation of the CIC in 2005 provided some renewed support for the 
growth of social enterprises; but more transformational organizational forms, such as 
those of the sharing economy, require more radical legal invention (Morgan and Kuch, 
2015). All of the four case studies presented here have benefited from this legislation, by 
incorporating themselves as CICs; what they lack, however, is readily available dedicated 
legal and financial advice attuned to their needs as social rather than public or private 
entities. In seeking to innovate organizational forms and social relations––and not 
merely products––these ‘social entrepreneurs run up against life-sapping frustrations, 
such as the inability of regulators, auditors, banks and accountants to classify these 
new forms’ (Davies, 2013: 220). What is required, therefore, is transformational change 
of the ‘softer tissues’ of regulatory and institutional norms as well as the ‘harder’ legal 
codes that help govern the institutional spaces within which grassroots innovations 
grow. Without concomitant innovations at ‘higher’ scales in political-economic and 
legal-institutional systems, these place-based initiatives risk remaining just that. If they 
do attempt to scale up, they too often succumb to isomorphic pressures to conform to 
institutional forms and requirements of funders, regulators and partners. The historical 
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growth, through EU Objective One funding, of social enterprise intermediaries in 
Liverpool provides a lesson in how scaling up can lead to codifications that constrain 
rather than enable creative urban transformation. Playing with the rules of the game all 
too easily slides into playing by the rules of the game.
Matthew Thompson, Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place, 
University of Liverpool, 1–7 Abercromby Square, Liverpool L69 7WY, UK,  
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